Research
Print page Print page
Switch language
The Capital Region of Denmark - a part of Copenhagen University Hospital
Published

Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia

Research output: Contribution to journalReviewResearchpeer-review

  1. The neurophenomenology of early psychosis: An integrative empirical study

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  2. Mysticism and schizophrenia: A phenomenological exploration of the structure of consciousness in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  3. The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearch

  4. Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task.

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  1. The neurophenomenology of early psychosis: An integrative empirical study

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  2. Selbststörungen und Scizophrenie: Eine phänomenologische Neubewetung mangelnder Krankheitseinsicht und Non-Complicance (transl).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

  3. Mental illness among relatives of successful academics: implications for psychopathology-creativity research

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  4. First-rank symptoms and self-disorders in schizophrenia

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

View graph of relations

In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refute the claim that episodes of thought insertion represent examples of experiences lacking for-me-ness. We highlight certain unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems that tend to hamper philosophical discussions of thought insertion. Although thought insertion does not involve a lack of for-me-ness, we do argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed for-me-ness. Finally, we offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and we discuss how a disturbed for-me-ness may be involved in the formation of thought insertion.

Original languageEnglish
JournalConsciousness and Cognition
Volume74
Pages (from-to)102770
ISSN1053-8100
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2019

ID: 58892860