Mentalization, embodiment, and narrative: Critical comments on the social ontology of mentalization theory

Recently, mentalization theory has risen to fame as a theoretical framework emphasising social cognition as a key issue in its approach to psychopathology and psychotherapy. In this article, I review and criticise the social-ontological assumptions made by mentalization theory, arguing that, in spite of a strong interactive focus, it remains fundamentally rooted in a Cartesian ontology, overlooking embodied, expressive, enactive, and sociocultural dimensions of social cognition. Furthermore, since mentalization theory was originally developed as a framework for understanding Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), I offer a reinterpretation of the issue of social cognition reported in BPD from a more embodied and interactional perspective. Contrary to the received view, I suggest that issues of social cognition in BPD should not necessarily be seen as a partial or total inability to mentalize, but rather as a hypersensitivity to expressivity resulting in what I suggest we understand as acts of disnarration.